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Case r j 0 . 880274-CA 
Salt Lake City, Utah (Addendum A). The search warrant authorized a 
search for "[c]ocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, 
packaging and scales." JEJ3. at 1, 
In the second paragraph of the affidavit in support of: 
the search warrant, Deputy Michael Droubay, the affiant, stated that 
within the past ten days, between February 24 and March 5, 1987, he 
used a confidential informant ("CI.") to make two "controlled" buys 
at 533 South Montgomery (Addendum B at 2). At the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, Deputy Droubay acknowledged that this statement 
was false since the C I . had never been inside the premises at 533 
Montgomery as far as Deputy Droubay knew (Transcript of Evidentiary 
Hearing held September 17, 1987, hereinafter "T" at 19, 20). 
The affidavit later stated that on two separate 
occasions, the affiant and assisting detectives searched the CI., 
then gave him money and instructions to purchase certain amounts of 
cocaine. The C I . then entered the Atherton apartment (Addendum 3, 
2-3) . 
According to the affidavit, shortly after the C I . 
entered the Atherton apartment, officers observed a man "known as 
Randy" leave the apartment and drive to the Montgomery address. Id. 
at 2. The affidavit pointed out: 
Your affiant received information, at that time, 
from the C I . as he entered the apartment, he was 
greeted by the suspect, known to us as RANDY. He 
handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then left 
the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the 
cocaine. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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Accord ing • V- i fr ida •;- i. - - - * s u s p e c t , ™ kri iwn as 
Randy, :>n each of t h e two o c c a s i o n s . v - • • •.*.-=-1 
t ime each way took twel / e t o s i x t e e n - . •.•.-.•:•>, : ie "o j^pecL" s.. aye:i 
a t tl :ie Montgomery house t w e n t y - t w o mlnu^ / s on :-;.r f i r s t o c c a s . j n and 
ei g1 1 f: i: i ii t i\ 1 1 e s <:: r 1 t h e • 3 e c o i t :i<:i ( 'Id . a-. » . 
According ! :o tl le affidavit, *-u~ c'rst ->cca.~-;->»-, Li-ie 
C.I. stated that at the time >rfiant war; awai^ 
that RANDY was at the Montgomery address, C.I. 
received, at the Atherton address, a phone call 
from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and 
that RANDY would be back, 
Iu. au j vem"-. : * ' * 
"Randy" i^os- • > -;ecire 3ru js and Rand/ subsequent ; * lef* K 
A- . - / 
Droi.-a; *-e^ -. * -. .. - :-*• v - -v. -. - * people otner r:'^ in the 
C r *-n- r *>-- >r ,-•- .u * and in * d^ 'Ldual other inan Randy 
1 
J
 - i *•- nan^ was 3ra 
;
" ;as i d e n t i f i e d by £LLS iia/ie : o us by t h e 
^ :;ne t ime of t h e f i r s t c o n t r o l l e d buy . We 
krierf w . : TS ; • ) be do l e ] t le ] r i J . a j ; we 
"i*-1 .*" ' * O W • 
(T. 16). 
Hen'""/ *•"• ''' ' ': '" • . i*ia^"Urate in biaiiuy unai. R 
m^ ' qomerv address, 
"* }' .am ' urth^r sta-.-*- • - considered the C VI. to 
be reliable ueca:j •.-••: 
Your attiant and assisting Detectives, havi^ 
had C I . purchase cocaine on at least eight 
separate occasions, and each representation made 
was born out by producing either cocaine or 
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana 
and cocaine on several occasions for your affiant 
and assisting Detectives. 
The affiant stated he verified the information from the 
C.I. in the following manner: 
Your affiant has used information given to him 
by the C.I. to make arrests of your narcotic 
dealers, said to obtain other search warrants. 
The previous search warrants obtained by your 
affiant and o-ther Narcotic Detectives using 
information, and controlled buys from the C.I. 
have all been confirmed by producing controlled 
substance, as a result of the authorized searches, 
including narcotics packaging, and resulting in 
arrests of persons for violation on those premises. 
Id. 
Deputy Droubay stated that he considered the C.I. 
reliable because he and assisting detectives had the C.I. purchase 
cocaine on prior occasions. However, Detective Droubay failed to 
include information in the affidavit that the C.I. was not an 
officer and had previously been arrested for Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance (T. 35). The judge was also not informed that 
officers were dropping four additional counts of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance against the C.I. in exchange for his undercover 
work (T. 40). 
Mr. Droubay also failed to inform the judge that during 
half an hour to an hour, "the suspect known as Randy" was in transit 
or at the Montgomery residence on each of the two occasions, no 
officers were watching the Atherton apartment which the C.I. had 
entered to make the "controlled" buys and that the C.I. was 
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Defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence seized on 
March 10f 1987, pursuant to the search warrant (R. 17). An 
evidentiary hearing was held on September 17, 1987 (R. 24). 
Thereafter, counsel submitted memoranda (R. 49-78) and the matter 
was orally argued on January 27, 1988 (R. 79). The trial judge 
denied the motion to suppress (R. 79). 
On February 8, 1988, the matter was submitted to the 
judge for decision based on the evidence introduced in the motion to 
suppress hearing plus additional stipulated facts (Trial Transcript 
hereinafter "TT" at 6). Defense counsel renewed her motion to 
suppress at trial and the trial judge again denied such motion 
(TT. 6) • 
The Court found Mr. Pyeatt guilty of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree 
felony; Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit: 
Marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and Unlawful Possession of 
Paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor (TT. 12). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The search warrant and supporting affidavit were invalid 
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
First, the affidavit on its face failed to state sufficient facts to 
establish the existence of probable cause to search the house at 533 
Montgomery Avenue. Second, even if the affidavit were facially 
sufficient, the affiant intentionally or recklessly included 
material misrepresentations and omitted material information. After 
- 6 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I . . .' . 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE 
INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
-«- *— * ' • suppress, defense counsel challenged the 
a] ' ILty M~ he sear v/arra- * . M - - M- {feder r •> -state 
•J :,% ' * " UU LOIitf u a * * 
a i i ^ M i *-, ^ ^ ai ' i i.-.. . . u i , i . -c f 'vj.-ss m i s r e p r e s e n t s • i ons 
i i a n i sn i -^ ~M^ fr )• i f i ' n i r w * . *.- *? -- r -ar*" ^ c u l a i i t y 
hereinafter "TH" at 6-13). The Court denied the motion to suppress 
(TH 27-8). (For entire transcript of judge's ruling, see 
Addendum C.) 
A review of the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant and testimony of the officers establishes that the decision 
of the trial court to deny the motion to suppress was erroneous. 
See State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-9 (Utah 1985). Hence, 
despite the "great deference [given] to a magistrate's determination 
of probable cause," the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress should be reversed on appeal. State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 
715, 719 (Utah 1983); see also Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 208-9. 
("[T]his Court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on 
questions of admissibility of evidence unless it appears that the 
lower court was in error."). 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT IN THAT 
IT FAILED TO STATE SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR A 
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to state criminal cases through the fourteenth amendment, 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli 
- 8 -
test1 followed previously when evaluating an affidavit which relied 
on an informant's tip, and embraced the broader "totality of the 
circumstances" test. 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common sense decision whether, 
given all circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity1 and 'basis of 
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in 
a particular place. 
462 U.S. at 238-9 (quotations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the United States 
Supreme Court in applying the more general "totality of the 
circumstances" test (see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985)), requiring that 
there be a fair probability that the evidence exists and can be 
found where the informant says it is located. See State v. 
Anderson; State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case, the affidavit failed to establish 
that cocaine was ever inside the premises at 533 Montgomery Avenue. 
While the facts set forth in the affidavit may have raised a 
suspicion that the cocaine obtained by the C.I. came Prom the 
Montgomery house, they did not amount to probable cause so as to 
allow a constitutionally permissible search. 
1 The test evolved from the cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 
The two prongs were (1) the affidavit was required to establish the 
basis of the informant's knowledge and (2) the affidavit must 
establish the informant's veracity or reliability. 
- 9 -
In many cases where the Utah Supreme Court has upheld a 
search warrant, an officer or confidential informant has actually 
seen the contraband inside the house. In State v. Anderton, the 
confidential informant observed marijuana inside the premises and 
relayed that information to the affiant, and in State v. Bailey, the 
confidential informant saw the stolen goods inside the premises and 
heard the defendant say he had burglarized an automotive shop. 
By contrast, in the instant case, the affidavit contains 
no assertion that anyone saw cocaine inside the premises at 
Montgomery Avenue. While the affidavit did contain a paragraph 
which stated: 
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware 
that RANDY was at the Montgomery address, C.I. 
received, at the Atherton address, a phone call 
from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on the scale and 
that RANDY would be back. 
that statement does not say that cocaine was being kept in the 
Montgomery house. Furthermore, the statement depends not only on 
the veracity and reliability of the C.I., but also on the 
reliability of "RANDY," who was an unknown in the operation and the 
primary suspect (T. 9-10). Because of the lack of verification and 
the general nature of the statement, the alleged statement by 
"Randy" fails to establish a fair probability that cocaine was in 
the Montgomery house at the time of the first buy. 
In addition, the affidavit failed to establish the 
reliability of the C.I. or any other participant. Although the 
formal two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test is no longer followed, 
compliance with that test is still a relevant consideration under 
- 10 -
the broader totality of the circumstances test. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
at 1101. 
In this case, the affidavit stated: 
Your affiant and assisting Detectives, have had 
the C.I. purchase cocaine on at least eight 
separate occasions, and each representation made 
was born out by producing either cocaine or 
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana 
and cocaine on several occasions for your affiant 
and assisting Detectives. 
It is unclear from this paragraph whether the officer was directly 
involved in the purchases or was informed of them by other 
officers. Nor is it clear the type or number of representations 
made by the C.I. which resulted in the purchase of drugs. The only 
piece of usable information in this paragraph is that on eight 
separate occasions, the C.I. was able to produce illicit drugs. 
The affidavit also stated: 
Your affiant has used information given to him 
by the C.I. to make arrests of your narcotic 
dealers, said to obtain other search warrants. 
The previous search warrants obtained by your 
affiant and other Narcotic Detectives using 
information, and controlled buys from the C.I. 
have all been confirmed by producing controlled 
substances, as a result of the authorized 
searches, including narcotics packaging, and 
resulting in arrests of persons for violation on 
those premises. 
The number of search warrants obtained based on the C.I.'s 
information and whether Droubay or another officer obtained them is 
not clear. While the searches incident to such search warrants 
produced drugs and packaging and led to the arrest of persons on the 
premises, the affidavit does not clarify whether specific 
information given by the C.I. led to those arrests or whether the 
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arrests resulted in convictions. As worded, the affidavit leaves 
some question as to the basis of the officer's belief that the C.I. 
was reliable. 
Furthermore, other than the "coincidence in timing" of 
the two visits to the Montgomery house by a person who had been 
present in the Atherton house, nothing in the affidavit indicated 
that cocaine sold to the C.I. came from the Pyeatt house, and not 
from the car or the Atherton house or some other source. 
In State v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa 
Supreme Court suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant where the affidavit stated that a third person met with an 
officer to sell him marijuana, then drove to a farmhouse and 
returned with the substance. The Court pointed out: 
Our problem with the facts of this case is that 
there was nothing beyond the mere coincidence of 
timing of the visit of Goodrich to the McManus 
farmhouse to connect defendant with any 
wrongdoing. There was no indication from the 
affidavit for the search warrant or the abstract 
of the oral testimony that Goodrich's auto did not 
already contain the marijuana before his visit to 
the farmhouse, that Goodrich took anything from 
the farmhouse to his car while there or that he 
even opened the trunk of the vehicle at any time 
he was at the farm. There was no indication of 
any independent information linking defendant to 
wrongdoing, of which the events of November 1 
might have been corroborative. There was no 
indication that Goodrich or anyone else provided 
information tending to incriminate defendant. 
Defendant himself was apparently not observed on 
November 1; the information for the search warrant 
indicated the affiant did not know who occupied 
the house near Lone Tree. There was no indication 
of any other suspicious visits to defendant's home. 
Id. at 578. 
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In State v. Witwer, 642 P.2d 828 (Alaska App. 1982), the 
Court upheld a search warrant where the affidavit was prepared after 
following a person engaged in the sale of cocaine to the premises on 
two separate occasions. The officers prepared the affidavit in 
anticipation that the seller would return to the premises a third 
time prior to consummating another sale and with the stipulation 
that the search warrant would be executed only if the seller went to 
the premises during a third transaction. The Witwer court 
emphasized the importance of that third transaction for reaching a 
conclusion that the detour to the premises must be related to the 
transaction and not merely coincidental. 
In the present case, the affidavit did not contain 
information that the officers saw "Randy" carrying anything as he 
left the Montgomery house on either of the two occasions. Nor did 
the affidavit contain information that Mr. Pyeatt sold the cocaine 
to anyone or that incriminated Mr. Pyeatt in any way. Officers did 
not even know who lived in the premises at 533 Montgomery when they 
requested the search warrant. 
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the 
affidavit failed to present sufficient facts that there was a "fair 
probability" that cocaine had been inside the premises at the 
Montgomery address at the time that the C.I. made the two 
"controlled" buys. 
Nor did the affidavit present sufficient facts to 
establish that even if cocaine had been sold at the Montgomery 
address, cocaine would be found there at the time the warrant was 
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executed. The affidavit asserted that "[w]ithin the past ten days, 
between the period of February 24th and March 5th, 1987," the 
affiant had executed two controlled buys using the C.I. The search 
warrant was not signed by the magistrate until March 10, 1987, at 
least five days after the last controlled buy and as much as sixteen 
days after the first buy. 
In State v. Kittredge, 585 P.2d 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), 
the Court held an affidavit stating that a C.I. was inside certain 
premises within the past ninety-six hours and had seen marijuana 
while inside was not sufficient for a finding of probable cause. 
The Court determined that the "peculiar facts set out in the 
affidavit were 'stale'" (^Id. at 424) and that the affidavit lacked 
sufficient showing that the marijuana would still be present. The 
Court pointed out that several facts were not made known in the 
affidavit including (1) the quantity of marijuana seen inside the 
premises, (2) in whose possession the marijuana was seen or (3) the 
prior history of the suspects which might suggest marijuana would 
still be on the premises. jM. at 424-5. 
Similarly in State v. McGee, 607 P.2d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 
1980), the Court invalidated a search warrant where the affidavit 
stated that a C.I. had seen marijuana in the defendant's house 
during the past forty-eight hours. The Court referred to Kittredge, 
stating: 
We observed that the affidavit did not relate how 
much marijuana was seen in the house, v/ho normally 
occupied the house, who actually possessed the 
marijuana, or whether the suspect had a history of 
drug use or dealings. 
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_Id. at 218. 
In the present case, the two buys could have occurred as 
long as sixteen days prior to the execution of the search warrant. 
Nothing contained in the affidavit established or suggested that had 
cocaine been at the Montgomery premises, it would still be there. 
The minimal number of contacts over a relatively short time span did 
not suggest an ongoing drug enterprise. Nor was there an assertion 
anywhere in the affidavit that the cocaine actually came from the 
Montgomery address or that anyone saw cocaine inside the premises. 
Obviously, since no one stated he or she saw cocaine inside the 
premises, the amount or who actually possessed the cocaine was not 
discussed. Finally, since officers had not bothered to ascertain 
who lived at the premises prior to obtaining the search warrant, 
they had no information regarding prior drug use or dealings by the 
occupants. 
Given the remoteness of the incidents discussed in the 
affidavit and the lack of information regarding items seen in the 
house or the occupants of the house, the affidavit failed to 
establish that, even if there had been cocaine in the house at one 
time, it would still be there when the search warrant was executed. 
The "good faith" exception to the probable cause 
requirement under the fourth amendment which was created in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984), 
and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 
1045 Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), does not permit the admission 
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of evidence seized from the Pyeatt home pursuant to the invalid 
warrant. The United States Supreme Court created the "good faith" 
exception to allow the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a 
search warrant which later proved to be defective where the 
"officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their 
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment." Leon, 468 U.S. at 
918. While in some circumstances it is objectively reasonable to 
believe that a search warrant is valid (see e.g. Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989), the high court made it clear "that in 
some circurastances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for 
believing that the warrant was properly issued." _Id. at 922. The 
Court pointed out: 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate 
remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a 
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 
that the affiant knew was false or would have 
known was false except for his reckless disregard 
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). 
Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith 
in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." (Citations omitted.) Finally, 
depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e. 
in failing to particularize the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized—that the 
executing officers cannot presume it to be valid. 
,Td. at 923. 
In the present case, as set forth in subpoint B below, 
Droubay, the affiant officer, knew that certain information 
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contained in the affidavit was false and misled the issuing 
magistrate by the use of such information and by the omission of 
other material information. Under such circumstances, the good 
faith exception is inapplicable. 
Furthermore, as set forth above, the affidavit on its 
face was so insufficient that an officer could not reasonably 
believe that probable cause to search the Montgomery house existed. 
The failure to particularize the items to be seized, instead giving 
a general description of cocaine and paraphernalia one might guess 
would be found, further suggests that an officer could not 
reasonably believe that the search warrant was valid. 
Because the affidavit failed to establish a fair 
probability that cocaine had been inside the house at 533 Montgomery 
Avenue or that if it had been, it was still there, no probable cause 
existed for a search of the Montgomery house. The evidence obtained 
pursuant to the invalid warrant is not admissible under the Leon 
good faith exception, and the fruits of the unlawful search should 
therefore be suppressed. 
B. MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct. 
2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held 
that a defendant has the right to an evidentiary hearing where he or 
she makes a preliminary showing that a false statement was 
intentionally included in the affidavit or done so with a reckless 
disregard for the truth and such false statement was necessary for a 
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finding of probable cause. The court further determined that if the 
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence at the 
hearing that the false statement was intentionally included by the 
affiant, or included with a reckless disregard for the truth, then 
the false material must be excised from the affidavit and the 
remaining information contained in the affidavit must be reviewed 
for a determination as to whether it supports a finding of probable 
cause. If probable cause does not exist without the excised 
material, the search warrant must be voided and the items seized 
under the warrant excluded. 
In Franks, the affiant officer included statements in the 
affidavit attributed to two persons at the Youth Center where the 
defendant had been employed. Defense counsel requested the 
opportunity to call the affiant officer to testify as well as the 
two individuals at the Youth Center and proffered that the two 
individuals would testify that they had not made the statements to 
the affiant. Defense counsel further contended that the affiants 
included the misstatements in the affidavit in bad faith. Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. at 158. Under such circumstances, the Court held 
that a hearing to determine the veracity of the information was 
appropriate. 
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh'g denied 
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Delaware, 
acknowledged that "[fjalse statements in a probable cause affidavit 
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a 
warrant issued in reliance thereon [citation omitted]." Id. at 
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111. In Slowe, the police officer prepared the affidavit prior to a 
transaction which was part of a "sting" operation. The transaction 
occurred essentially as anticipated, and the statements in the 
affidavit were, for the most part, accurate. Although the Court did 
not condone the preparation of affidavits prior to the occurrence of 
events described therein, it found no error and determined that 
"[t]he minor discrepancies that did occur did not undermine the 
essential truth of the allegations or rise to the level of 
knowingly, intentionally or recklessly making a false statement." 
Id. at 111. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 138 (Utah 1986), cert, 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565, decided shortly after Slowe, the Utah 
Supreme Court followed the fourth amendment analysis in Franks v. 
Delaware and extended the Franks analysis to include omissions as 
well as misrepresentations. The court pointed out that the 
affidavit must be examined to determine whether the affidavit would 
support a finding of probable cause if material misrepresentations 
were not included or if material omissions were added. In Nielsen, 
the officer swore in the affidavit that a confidential informant 
told him that a person living at Nielsen's address and driving a 
distinctive car had a large amount of cocaine in his possession. 
The officer attested to the C.I.'s reliability based on prior 
transactions with the C.I. At the preliminary hearing, the officer 
essentially reiterated the statements in the affidavit. J[d. at 190. 
After the preliminary hearing, the state revealed that 
the affiant did not know the C.I. and had not been informed of the 
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details in the affidavit. Instead, another police officer who 
worked with the C.I. had given the information to the affiant 
officer. Id. 
The Court found the state's contention that the false 
statements were not made intentionally or with a reckless disregard 
for truth "entirely unpersuasive," pointing out: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only 
of the need for accuracy in the information 
provided to a magistrate in support of an 
application for a search warrant, but also of the 
importance of absolute truthfulness in any 
statements made under oath. 
Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 
Despite the intentional false statements made by the 
officer in the affidavit, the Nielsen court upheld the search 
warrant "under federal law" (Ij3. at 192) because the falsehood "was 
not material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause." j[d. at 
191. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the "presumption 
that police officers will be truthful in their communications with 
each other, [and the rule that] double hearsay may support the 
issuance of a warrant. . .". J^ d. at 192. 
In State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court followed the fourth amendment rule set forth in Franks v. 
Delaware and State v. Nielsen and determined that the alleged 
misstatements were not included intentionally or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth since they "were based upon reasonably 
reliable information such as official public documents" (Ici. at 
1366-7) and the defendant did not present evidence that the affiant 
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included the falsehood intentionally or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth. Ld. at 1367. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that omissions of 
material information from an affidavit as well as material 
misrepresentations in the affidavit must be considered when 
determining whether the search warrant is valid. Where information 
is omitted from an affidavit, "the affidavit must be evaluated to 
determine if it will support a finding of probable cause when the 
omitted information is inserted (citations omitted)." State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. 
In People v. Kurland, 618 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1980), cert, 
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), the California Supreme Court discussed 
the impact of the omission of facts from an affidavit and concluded 
that "the affiant's duty of disclosure extends only to 'material' or 
'relevant' adverse facts (footnote omitted)." jjd. at 218. The 
Court concluded that omitted facts are material "if their omission 
would make the affidavit substantially misleading." _Id. The Court 
went on to say that facts are material if "there is a substantial 
possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate's 
probable cause determination." Id. 
The Colorado Supreme Court pointed out in People v. 
Winden, 689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984) that: 
Omissions that are the product of an intentional 
effort to mislead the issuing magistrate or a 
reckless disregard of known material facts would 
normally justify more severe sanctions than errors 
occurring for other reasons. 
Id. at 583. The rationale for more severe sanctions such as the 
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quashing of the warrant where information is intentionally omitted 
is that : 
When the police edit their information and 
withhold from the magistrate potentially adverse 
facts which they view as irrelevant or cumulative, 
then the police interfere with the magistrate's 
constitutional function. Although in such cases 
warrant applications may contain facts rather than 
conclusions, such affidavits are nonetheless 
conclusory in their selectivity. As a result, 
there is an increased risk that the privacy of the 
citizenry will be invaded on the basis of the 
police's as opposed to the court's assessment of 
relevance and reasonableness. 
People v. Kurland, 618 P.2d at 226 (Bird, J., dissenting). 
In the instant case, material misrepresentations were 
included in the affidavit and material information which might have 
altered the judge's probable cause determination was omitted from 
the affidavit. The most glaring misrepresentation occurred in the 
second paragraph of the facts listed in the affidavit.2 m that 
paragraph, Deputy Droubay stated that within the past ten days, 
between February 24 and March 5, 1987,3 he had used a confidential 
informant to execute two controlled buys of cocaine at 533 
Montgomery Ave. (Addendum B at 2). At the hearing, Deputy Droubay 
acknowledged that this statement was false since the C.I. had never 
been inside the Montgomery address (T. 19,20). 
2
 The first paragraph outlined Deputy Droubay's 
background and experience. 
3 The search warrant was signed on March 10, 1987, so 
this statement regarding timing of the buys was also inaccurate. 
Had the buys been made in the ten days prior to signing of the 
search warrant, they would have been made between March 1 and 
March 10, 1987. Judge McCleve apparently made no effort to clarify 
this discrepancy. 
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The misrepresentation in the instant case is more 
egregious than that which was included in the affidavit in State v, 
Nielsen. In Nielsen, the information from the C.I. was essentially 
correct; the misrepresentation involved which officer had received 
the information and could attest to the reliability of the C.I., but 
not the essence of the information upon which probable cause was 
found. In the case before the Court, the misrepresentation went to 
the heart of the probable cause finding and was included 
intentionally or, at the very least, with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. 
As the Nielsen court emphasized, a law enforcement 
officer is aware of the need for accuracy and truthfulness in 
preparing an affidavit and such awareness should be taken into 
account when determining whether the officer had the requisite 
intent when he included the falsehood. 
A police officer is also aware of the haste with which an 
affidavit is often reviewed. In Franks v. Delaware, the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged that: 
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be 
marked by haste, because of the understandable 
desire to act before the evidence disappears; this 
urgency will not always permit the magistrate to 
make an extended independent examination of the 
affiant or other witnesses. 
Id. at 680.4 
4
 In the Third Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, the 
judge generally signs search warrants during a brief recess in 
arraignments. 
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The location of the false information in the affidavit 
supports a determination that the affiant intentionally included the 
falsehoods. The first paragraph of the facts in the affidavit 
outline Deputy Droubay's background and experience. Therefore, the 
second paragraph containing the misrepresentation that two 
controlled buys occurred at the address to be searched was the first 
information concerning the basis for the search warrant to reach the 
magistrate. 
The organization and substance of the remainder of the 
affidavit does little to dispel the incorrect impression initially 
given the magistrate and thus adds support to a finding that the 
Deputy intentionally misrepresented the facts to the magistrate. 
The third paragraph discusses preparing the C.I. to make a 
controlled buy and offers no information that this occurred at the 
Atherton address and not the place to be searched. The fourth, 
fifth and sixth paragraphs state that the C.T. entered the Atherton 
apartment and that someone then left the Atherton location and drove 
to the Montgomery address, then returned. A magistrate quickly 
scanning the affidavit might not pick up that two addresses were 
involved; even if she did, it is not clear that the person who left 
the Atherton apartment is someone other than the C.I. It is not 
until the second paragraph on page three of the affidavit that it 
becomes apparent the C.I. and Randy are different people. Given the 
complicated scenario, the lengthy fact statement, and the multiple 
persons and addresses involved, the officer should have known that 
the information in the first "substantive" paragraph would have an 
- 24 -
overwhelming impact on the magistrate. 
The numerous other misrepresentations and omissions of 
information from the affidavit show that Droubay was intentionally 
attempting to mislead the magistrate. As outlined in Point IA at 
14/ Droubay's statement regarding the timing of the two buys was 
inaccurate, and the incidents may have occurred as much as sixteen 
days prior to issuance of the search warrant. 
In addition, Droubay stated that the C.I. told him that 
"as he entered the apartment, he was greeted by the suspect, known 
to us as RANDY. He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then 
left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine. 
(Addendum 3 at 3). 
Despite somewhat confusing testimony as to who Randy was 
and whether he or someone else drove from the Atherton address to 
the Montgomery address, Droubay acknowledged that the person who 
officers followed from the Atherton address was not Randy: 
A: His first name was Brad. . . . He was 
identified by first name to us by the C.I. at the 
time of the first controlled buy. We knew who was 
going to be doing the driving; we knew who we had 
to follow. 
T. 16. 
The misinformation regarding whether Randy or Brad or 
someone else drove to the Montgomery address is significant when 
considered in conjunction with Droubay's assertion to Judge McCleve 
in the affidavit that the C.I. gave the money to Randy for a 
purchase and Randy then drove to the Montgomery address. If the 
C.I. actually gave the money to Randy and another person then drove 
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to the Montgomery house, the connection between the C.I., the 
"controlled buy" and the Montgomery address is much more attenuated 
than if the C.T. gave the money to someone who then drove to the 
Montgomery house. 
In asking for a no-knock warrant that could be served at 
any time, Deputy Droubay also stated that: 
Independent surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that 
the persons residing in the residence are usually 
away during the day. 
Addendum B at 4. Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery house on 
only three occasions. He kept no notes but testified that one of 
those occasions was during the day and two were in the evening 
(T. 66-67). During those visits, he saw three people enter and 
leave the house. Although he stated in the affidavit that the 
people who reside at the Montgomery house were "usually av/ay during 
the day" (Addendum 3 at 4), he testified that he did not know who 
resided in the house and that during his single daytime visit, he 
saw children present (T. 59-60). The presence of children during 
the day suggests, contrary to the sworn statement of Deputy Droubay, 
that the occupants were present during the day. Furthermore, a 
single daytime surveillance is not sufficient to support the 
conclusion that the occupants were "usually" gone. 
Finally, in asking that the search warrant be issued, 
Droubay reiterated that "your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the 
C.I. on two different occasions." Addendum B at 4. Although the 
Montgomery address is not stated, the implication is that the buys 
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occurred at that address. The sentence is located at a place within 
the affidavit where a magistrate quickly scanning the material would 
be apt to focus. The repetition of the incorrect information 
contained in the second paragraph further suggests Droubay had the 
requisite intent in including the false information. 
Droubay also failed to include several pieces of material 
information in the affidavit. He did not inform the magistrate that 
during the half hour to hour that he and other detectives followed 
the person from the Atherton address, the C.I. was left unattended. 
Droubayfs attempt to cover this lapse when testifying (T. 38-9), 
when read in conjunction with the testimony of the other officers 
that no officers remained at the Atherton address, further 
establishes that Droubay acted in bad faith and intentionally or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth in presenting false 
information to the magistrate. 
Droubay also did not inform the magistrate that persons 
other than "Randy" resided at the Atherton address or that other 
people were in the Atherton apartment when the C.I. entered 
(T. 11-12, 13, 41). Nor did Deputy Droubay inform the magistrate 
that the C.I., who was left alone for a long period of time, was not 
an officer, that he had been arrested for Distribution of Controlled 
Substance, and that officers were dropping four additional counts of 
Distribution of Controlled Substance against the C.I. for his 
undercover work (T. 40). 
The nature of the false information, its location in the 
affidavit, the organization of the affidavit, and the numerous 
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additional misstatements and omissions coupled with the glaring 
falseness of the statement and attempts to mislead the trial court 
judge with false testimony establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Droubay intentionally included the falsehoods or did 
so with a reckless disregard for the truth. These were not innocent 
mistakes but a deliberate attempt to mislead the magistrate. Based 
on the officer's testimony and a review of the affidavit, it is 
clear that the trial judge's finding that Deputy Droubay did not act 
in bad faith was erroneous. 
Pursuant to the analysis set forth in State v. Nielsen 
and Franks v. Delaware/ once the defendant establishes that an 
officer intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
included a falsehood in the affidavit, under the fourth amendment, 
the falsehood must be excised and the remainder of the affidavit 
analyzed for a determination as to whether probable cause to support 
a search warrant existed. In addition, material omissions must be 
inserted when determining whether a search warrant should be upheld. 
In determining whether probable cause existed for the 
issuance of a search warrant under the fourth amendment, the 
statements regarding controlled buys being made at the Montgomery 
address must be excised.5 
5
 Because of the location of this paragraph, and the 
pervasiveness of this type of information, the taint of the 
misinformation is difficult to excise. A magistrate who read the 
second paragraph and reviewed the information that two controlled 
buys had occurred at the premises to be searched would have 
difficulty ferreting out the true facts from the complicated 
scenario outlined in the affidavit. 
- 28 -
The information regarding the C.T. giving the money to 
Randy and Randy leaving must also be excised since the officer knew 
at the time he wrote the affidavit that this was incorrect. 
Similarly, the information regarding a phone call from Randy while 
at the Montgomery address must be excised because the officer knew 
at the time he drafted the affidavit that Randy was not at the 
Montgomery address. 
In addition, information that the C.I. was left 
unattended for the half hour to hour during which the officers drove 
to and waited at the Montgomery residence must be inserted along 
with information that the C.I. had been arrested in the past for 
Distribution of Controlled Substance and the officers were dropping 
additional charges involving illegal drugs based on the C.I. working 
with them.6 
An examination of the affidavit without the false 
information and including the omitted information reveals that 
probable cause for the warrant did not exist. As outlined in 
subpoint A, no one saw cocaine inside the Montgomery house and the 
cocaine the C.I. gave officers could have come from the car, the 
Atherton house, or other people inside the Atherton house. The 
information that the C.I. was left unattended for a significant 
period of time raises numerous other potential sources—the C.I. 
could have left the Atherton address to obtain cocaine or others, 
6
 Some judges believe that an intentional material 
omission requires that the search warrant be quashed. See People v. 
Kurland, 618 P.2d at 226 (Bird, J., dissenting); People v. Winden, 
689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984) . 
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undetected by the absent officers, could have entered the apartment 
with cocaine. 
The added information that the C.I. had allegedly 
participated in the sale of illegal drugs and stood to benefit by 
the dismissal of four counts of Distribution of Controlled 
Substances by helping officers impacts on the issue of the C.I.'s 
reliability. As previously outlined, the general statements in the 
affidavit regarding the C.I.'s credibility left some question as to 
whether information from the C.I. had ever resulted in a 
conviction. Although the affidavit does not assert that the C.I. 
said the cocaine came from Randy, the C.I.'s reliability is 
nevertheless of paramount importance in light of the significant 
amount of time he was left unattended during which he could have 
obtained cocaine from numerous sources. 
In addition, the information regarding the phone call 
from "Randy" must be excised since the officer knew that Randy was 
not the person who left the house. Finally, had the magistrate 
known that officers had conducted surveillance of the Montgomery 
residence on only one occasion during the day and that the 
occupants, which included children, may well have been home at that 
time and the "heavier traffic" at night consisted of only three 
people, there is a substantial possibility her decision to issue the 
search warrant might have been different. 
As outlined in Point IA, the affidavit was very weak on 
its face. Once the falsehoods are excised and material omissions 
inserted, it becomes apparent that the trial court erred in 
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upholding the search warrant, since probable cause to search the 
Montgomery residence did not exist. The evidence seized pursuant to 
the invalid search warrant should have been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE 
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
It is well established that Utah is free to analyze its 
state constitution differently from case law which is based on an 
interpretation of the federal constitution. See State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged 
that federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth 
of rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and 
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution may be preferable to a fourth 
amendment analysis. .1(3., see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 
n.7 (Utah App. 1987) (pet, cert, granted); I<1. at 103-5 (Billings, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
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In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), although 
the majority? asserted that the court had not interpreted article I, 
section 14 differently from the fourth amendment, it acknowledged 
that "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating 
this State's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts. (Citations omitted. ) n ld9 at 1221, n.8. 
In his dissent in Watts,8 Justice Zimmerman disagreed 
with the majority's statement that the Court has "'never drawn any 
distinctions' between article I, section 14 and the federal fourth 
amendment and has 'always considered the protections afforded to be 
one and the same.'" id,, at 1125. He pointed out: 
Several of our older cases may have language 
that supports this view, although none have 
pondered the question deeply, and some members of 
this Court may still agree with it, but I do not 
think this dictum expresses the views of all those 
joining in the Chief Justice's opinion, much less 
a majority of the Court. My view on this point 
finds support in footnote 8 of the majority 
opinion, which differs dramatically in tone from 
the text referred to above. 
Id. at 1226. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court 
concluded that the falsehood contained in the affidavit was not 
7 The majority was comprised of Justices Hall and Howe 
and Judge Orme of this Court participating in the place of Justice 
Stewart. 
8 justice Durham concurred in Justice Zimmerman's dissent. 
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material and upheld the search warrant under the Franks fourth 
amendment analysis. The Court pointed out, however, that the 
decision was not dispositive of how the issue might be resolved 
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court 
acknowledged that "the federal law as it has developed since 
Franks v. Delaware is not entirely adequate" and that "[t]here is no 
stronger argument for developing adequate remedies for violation of 
the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable 
searches and seizures than the example of a police officer 
deliberately lying under oath in order to obtain a search warrant." 
Id. at 192-3. Hence, an analysis under the Utah Constitution 
distinct from that in Franks v. Delaware is appropriate where 
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant or omitted therefrom.9 
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Franks v. Delaware, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed 
out that "[i]f the affiant intentionally makes false statements to 
mislead a judicial officer on application for a warrant, these 
falsehoods render the warrant invalid regardless of whether or not 
such statements are material to establishing probable cause." 
9 in Franks, the defendant "conceded that if what is left 
is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are 
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to 
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172. Hence, the 
issue of whether an intentional or reckless misrepresentation in an 
affidavit invalidates the search warrant was not presented to the 
high court. 
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United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United 
States v, Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974). 
The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from the decision in 
Franks in interpreting its constitutional proscription against 
unreasonable search and seizure. See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 
(Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986). In 
State v. Malkin, the Court noted: 
If, in fact, the police officer affiant 
intentionally made the misstatements then the 
search warrant should be invalidated whether or not 
probable cause would remain from the affidavit 
after the misstatements were excised. A deliberate 
attempt to mislead a judicial officer in a sworn 
affidavit deserves the most severe deterrent 
sanction that the exclusionary rule can provide. 
Further, the fact that the officer has lied puts 
the credibility of the officer and of the entire 
affidavit into doubt. (Citations omitted.) 
Id., at 946 n.6. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
that a warrant cannot "survive the intentional deception of a 
magistrate by an affiant" in State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La. 
1980) . 
In People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978), the 
California Supreme Court also determined that where deliberate 
falsehoods are contained in an affidavit, the entire affidavit and 
search warrant must be quashed. The Court noted: 
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes, 
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit 
does not leave the remaining allegations unaffected 
and hence presumptively true. The fact that the 
misstatements are intentional injects a new element 
into the analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a 
witness knowingly false in one part of his 
testimony is to be distrusted in the whole. 
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Id, at 140. The court summed up that "although the court can excise 
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder 
to be true. Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the 
court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but 
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search. [Citations 
omitted.]" j[d. at 141. 
The Court pointed out that elimination of intentional 
falsehoods is not enough since officers would have "everything to 
gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal 
affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the 
distinction between fact and fantasy. [Citations omitted.]" Id. 
The reasoning of the Alaska, Louisiana and California 
courts, among others, should be adopted when analyzing article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Where an officer intentionally 
includes false information in an affidavit or includes such 
information with a reckless disregard for its truth, the entire 
affidavit should be invalidated. The fact that a significant 
misrepresentation was included in an affidavit, despite the 
officer's awareness of the necessity for accuracy (see State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191), raises a question as to the reliability 
and veracity of the information contained in the rest of the 
affidavit. Furthermore, officers who intentionally or recklessly 
include falsehoods in an affidavit should realize that negative 
repercussions will result from the use of such misrepresentations. 
In the present case, where numerous misrepresentations, 
stretching of the facts and omissions occurred, the entire affidavit 
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becomes suspect. The overwhelming taint of the falsehood contained 
in the second paragraph permeates the entire affidavit. Rather than 
attempting to excise the many falsehoods and insert the omissions, 
this Court should adopt the more straightforward approach that 
article I, section 14 requires that an affidavit be invalidated 
where an officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth swears to a material misrepresentation. 
As outlined in Point IB, the misrepresentations were 
included intentionally or, at the very least, with a reckless 
disregard for the truth and the omissions were left out with the 
intent to mislead the magistrate. Under article I, section 14, the 
search warrant in this case should be invalidated as a result of the 
intentional or reckless misrepresentations and omissions in the 
affidavit. 
California courts have also held that where a 
misrepresentation is negligently included in an affidavit, the 
misrepresentation must be excised and the affidavit reviewed for a 
determination as to whether probable cause exists absent the false 
statement. See People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) 
(modified on denial of rehyg); People v. Cook, supra. Even if this 
Court determines that Droubay was merely negligent in including the 
false statements, it should nevertheless, under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, excise the false statements and 
review the remainder of the affidavit. Even if the statements were 
included negligently, they were nevertheless false and not properly 
included. 
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The affidavit absent the false statements, as set forth in 
Point IB above, does not set forth sufficient facts for a finding of 
probable cause and the search warrant should therefore be quashed 
and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant suppressed. 
This Court should follow the lead of other state courts 
and interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution to 
require that where an officer affiant intentionally or recklessly 
includes material misstatements in and omits material information 
from an affidavit, the entire affidavit must be invalidated. In 
addition, this Court should interpret the State Constitution to 
require the excision of misstatements which are negligently included 
in an affidavit. Pursuant to either approach, the search warrant 
was invalid under the Utah Constitution and evidence seized pursuant 
to the invalid warrant should be suppressed. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the 
illegally seized evidence, or, in the alternative, dismissal. 
POINT III 
THS SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATES STATUTORY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICULARITY. 
Both the fourth amendment of the federal constitution and 
article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that a search 
warrant describe with particularity the items to be seized. Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-3(1) (1953 as amended) also requires that a search 
warrant particularly describe the evidence or property to be seized. 
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In Allen v, Holbrook, 135 P.2d 242, 249 (Utah 1943) 
modified on reh'g. and pet, denied, 139 P.2d 233 (Utah 1943), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained the particularity requirement: 
The goods to be seized must be described with such 
certainty as to identify them, and the description 
must be so particular that the officer charged with 
the execution of the warrant will be left with no 
discretion respecting the property to be taken 
(citations omitted). 
Id. at 249. 
In the instant case, both the search warrant and the 
affidavit list the items to be seized as "Cocaine, a white powdery 
substance, cutting agents, packaging and scales." The types of 
cutting agents, packaging and scales and the amount or consistency 
of cocaine are not specified. Such a general description of the 
items to be seized violates the particularity requirement of both 
constitutions as well as the statutory requirement, and the items 
seized pursuant to the search warrant should therefore be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial without the 
illegally seized evidence or, in the alternative, dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this / (^  day of November, 1988. 
• / 
•-.<-£/ UU?]&::-
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
vfOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Courtside Office Building SALT L ^ l Ui\'.zl:,l" " 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
C. Mike Droubay - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Narcotics 
Division, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DI§W5Btntf$F OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESS I cf^u^fiait(Li^TROLLEC SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR V A L U E ^ % T^^^^fn^}^ 
^a/7 salt Uke Co2>v ^ \ - i b e \ c * c u i i Court St** 
certify that *h„ . ™T' ' oatt Uk« r w ^ j : 0 ^ Stat. 
clerk. ,3,^6cumew-e>rt- fife J! £f ** a™ ft;.l 
day of - ^ ^ W - ^ J p * C c ^ J^f 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
You are therefore commanded: 
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search may 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may 
result to any person if notice were given) 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the 
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same 
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this V^ day of March, 1987. 
" JUDGE'OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
By: HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 Ease 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
): ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: SHEILA MCCLEVE 4 50 SOUTH 200 EAST 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff with two 
and a half years of law enforcement experience. Your affiant is 
presently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Your affiant has been 
trained by P.O.S.T., Utah Police Academy, in the identification of 
narcotics. Your affiant has also received continued education and 
training regarding narcotic dealings through experienced police 
officers and on the job experience. 
Within the past ten days, between the period of February 24th 
and March 5th, 1987, your affiant has executed two controlled buys of 
cocaine, using a confidential informant. Hereafter, referred to as 
C.I. to obtain cocaine at 533 South Montgomery, the east duplex, Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
On the first occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant, and 
assisting Detectives, where the C.I. was searched. The C.I. had no 
money, nor controlled substances, on his person. The C.I. was given 
$275.00, consisting of two $100.00 bills, three $20.00 bills, one 
$10.00 bill, and one $5.00 bill, and given instructions to purchase 
3.5 grams of cocaine, known as an "eight ball". 
At that point, the C.I. left your affiantfs vehicle and 
walked directly to 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartment 
Complex, building #7, Apartment 144. He was observed by your affiant 
to enter that apartment building. He did not make any stops, divert 
his paths, or make contacts with anyone, up to that point. 
Approximately two minutes later, a male white, approximately 
5f9M, 150 pounds, blonde, curly hair, known as RANDY, was observed by 
your affiant leaving the apartment, went to the parking lot, and got 
into a 1982 Datsun, red in color, Utah listing: MVT 214. This 
suspect was then followed by the Narcotics Squad to 533 South 
Montgomery. He made no stops, nor did he divert his path, prior to 
arriving at the Montgomery address. The suspect parked his car in 
front of the Montgomery address, and was observed by myself and 
Deputy Herlin, to enter the east door of the red brick duplex at that 
time. The suspect stayed there for approximately twenty-two minutes, 
and then was observed by Deputy Judd leaving the same door of the 
residence, getting back into his vehicle, and then again proceeded 
south bound on Interstate 15. 
He was followed by myself and the Narcotics Squad, directly 
back to 4545 Atherton, Apartment #144. He made no stops, nor did he 
divert his path this time either. The suspect arrived back at the 
apartment in approximately fifteen minutes, walked directly from his 
car back into the apartment, where approximately five minutes later, 
the C.I. was observed to exit the apartment, and walk directly back 
to your affiant's vehicle. 
PAGE Three 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The C.I. was re-searched at that time, finding no U.S. 
Currency, or controlled substances on him, besides a small paper 
bindle, inside a plastic bag, which contained a white powdery 
substance. The package, containing the white powdery substance, was 
field tested by your affiant. A portion of which resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware that RANDY was 
at the Montgomery address, C.I. received, at the Atherton address, a 
phone call from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and that RANDY 
would be back. 
Your affiant received information, at that time, from the 
C.I. as he entered the apartment, he was greeted by the suspect, 
known to us as RANDY. He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY 
then left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine. 
On the second occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant and 
assisting detectives, where the C.I. was searched again, finding no 
U. S. currency or controlled substances on him. At that point, he 
was given $220.00 in U. S. currency, consisting of two $100.00 bills, 
and one $20.00 bill. The C.I. was given instructions at that time to 
purchase two grams of cocaine. The C.I. got back into his vehicle, 
which had also been searched by your affiant, drove directly to 4545 
Atherton, Apartment #144. He did not divert his path, nor make 
contact with anybody. He then left his vehicle and walk directly to 
apartment #144, and was given entrance. 
Approximately three minutes later, the same suspect, known as 
RANDY, exited the apartment and walked directly to the 1979 Mercury 
Monarc, with Utah listing: 161 AMW. He got into the vehicle and 
proceeded out of the apartment complex, east on 45th South, and north 
on Interstate 15, followed by the entire Narcotics Squad. 
The suspect remained northbound on Interstate IS to the 
Redwood Road exit, took the Redwood Road exit to 5th South, went from 
5th South, directly to 533 South Montgomery, where he was observed by 
Deputy Rigby to walk directly to 533 Montgomery and enter. This 
being sixteen minutes, from the time he left the Atherton address. 
The suspect stayed inside the residence for approximately 
eight minutes, and then was observed by Deputy Rigby to exit the 
residence, walk directly to his car, and proceeded to 5th South, then 
to Redwood Road, then back to Interstate 15 southbound. 
At this point, the suspect drove directly back to 4545 
Atherton, #144, without diverting his path, or making contact with 
anybody. He was observed by Deputy Rigby to park the car in the 
parking lot, and walk directly to #144 and enter. 
PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
One minute later, your affiant observed the C.I. exit the 
residence, walk directly to his vehicle, and drive to a pre-arranged 
point, without diverting his path, or making contact with anyone. He 
was re-searched approximately four minutes, as was his vehicle, 
finding no controlled substances, other than a small paper bindle, 
containing a white powdery substance, which he was instructed to 
order from the suspect known as RANDY. 
The package that contained the white powdery substance, a 
portion of which was tested by your affiant. It resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an 
unnamed source) 
Your affiant and assisting Detectives, have had the C.I. 
purchase cocaine on at least eight separate occasions, and each 
representation made was born out by producing either cocaine or 
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana and cocaine on 
several occasions for your affiant and assisting Detectives. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following 
independent investigation: 
Your affiant has used information given to him by the C.I. to 
make arrests of your narcotic dealers, said to obtain other search 
warrants. The previous search warrants obtained by your affiant and 
other Narcotic Detectives using information, and controlled buys from 
the C.I. have all been confirmed by producing controlled substances, 
as a result of the authorized searches, including narcotics 
packaging, and resulting in arrests of persons for violation on those 
premises. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other good reasons, to-wit: 
Your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the C.I. on two 
different occasions. Independant surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that the persons residing 
in the residence are usually away during the day. 
PAGE FIVE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's 
authority or purpose because: 
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
of, or secreted. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this /fQr/'day of March, 1987. 
JUDSE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
ADDENDUM C 
1 d e f e n s e t h a t t h i s t a k i n g of e v i d e n c e from t h e 
2 Montgomery S t r e e t a d d r e s s was in v i o l a t i o n of Mr, 
3 P y e a t t ' s S t a t e and F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . 
4 Thank you . 
5 THE COURT: The Court reviewed both 
6 memorandums, both memoranda in this case. I did take 
7 fairly complete notes on the matter. Ifve reviewed 
8 that. I have a reasonably accurate memory. And the 
9 Court observes in making a probable cause 
10 determination ruling# we are dealing with 
11 probabilities , not certitudes. 
12 Given the fact that the Court has to 
13 allow some credence to the conduct of the issuing 
14 magistrate -- the Court must assume that Judge McCleve 
15 deals in preliminary hearings on a regular basis, that 
16 she issues warrants on a regular basis and she's 
17 engaged in that business with greater intensity and 
18 familiarity than is this Court, so the Court must 
19 assume that she has perhaps a greater level of 
20 familiarity with these things than the reviewing 
21 Court. 
22 The Court in these cases gets these 
23 motions to suppress, and it is not the most frequent 
24 thing. But the Court observes a consistent pattern in 
25 these kinds of actions. And your affidavit does state 
27 
1 that there were eight transactions, as I recall, with 
2 the confidential informant. Prior to these 
3 transactions, we have two controlled buys before the 
4 warrant issued in this case. And although there are 
5 some inaccuracies, there's nothing in the testimony of 
6 Officer Drewbay, there's nothing in the affidavit, 
7 that suggests any bad faith on the part of the 
8 officers involved in this case. 
91 The pattern of going to one location, 
10 the strip search, giving the CI money and having him 
11 make contact, transfer the money and then go to 
12 another place to get the drugs is a pattern that the 
13 Court has observed in every case it's been involved 
14 in. And from that, I think the officers can see a 
15 common pattern from which they can draw reasonable 
16 inferences . 
17 And given all of those circumstances, I 
18 think there's sufficient -- reviewing the affidavit 
19 and considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
20 Court finds that there's nothing insufficient about 
21 the affidavit sufficient to vitiate the probable cause 
22 determination made by Judge McCleve, therefore denies 
23 the motion to suppress. 
24 MS. WELLS: Your Honor, as the Court is 
25 aware, that is the case. I mean, what I had suggested 
28 
